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Abstract 
The Battle of Sidi Rezegh in November 1941 and the fall of Tobruk in June 
1942 were disastrous for South Africa.  At Sidi Rezegh, the entire 5th South 
African Infantry Brigade was lost and at Tobruk the following year more 
than 10 000 South Africans were captured by German forces.  As if the 
shock of becoming prisoners of war (POWs) was not bad enough, most 
South Africans were horrified when the Germans promptly handed them 
over to the Italians, who were to deal with the logistics for the thousands of 
POWs, first housing them in temporary camps in North Africa, and then 
transporting them to Italy.  Once on the European continent, the South 
African POWs found themselves in better-organised prison camps, although 
most POW accommodation was a far cry from what the Geneva Convention 
required.  Some were fortunate to be assigned to labour detachments, where 
they were in a better position to take control of their circumstances with 
regard to living conditions and food and even gaining a degree of freedom 
of movement.  During each of the stages of their captivity under the Italians, 
the South African POWs displayed changing attitudes towards their captors.  
For the most part, the Italian forces in North Africa were viewed with 
disrespect and sometimes with cynical amusement.  The antagonism towards 
Italians quickly changed to intense hatred when POWs suffered severe 
deprivations in the cargo holds of the boats that transported them to Italy.  
Once in Italy, however, the POWs came into contact with Italian camp 
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guards who, in many cases, displayed a remarkable lack of interest in the 
prisoners and in the war.  The changing attitudes of South African POWs 
towards their Italian captors reflect to an extent their changing 
circumstances as captives; however, their behaviour towards their captors 
also reveal how the POWs adapted to and accepted their POW identity.  
Ultimately, the POWs contact with the enemy captors changed the way they 
viewed their part in the war, and this article looks at examples of the shifting 
mind-sets until the Armistice in 1943 once again changed the state of affairs 
for the POWs.1  
Keywords: Prisoners of war (POWs), World War II, South Africa, Italy, Sidi 
Rezegh, Tobruk, Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel, Major General H.B. 
Klopper 
Introduction 
South African prisoner-of-war (POW) experience during World War Two 
can be viewed as a collective experience, in that all of those captured lived 
through remarkably similar experiences, but simultaneously experiences 
were also of an individual nature because each POW saw and lived through 
the war and his captivity from a uniquely contextualised perspective.  A case 
in point is the way those South Africa who were captured during the Battle 
of Sidi Rezegh and the fall of Tobruk in June 1942 viewed their Italian 
captors.  The POW experience of these men, and specifically those whose 
narratives were available for this study, included the initial shock and 
deprivations of the so-called “hell camps” of North Africa.  The second 
phase of their captivity under Italian authority involves their transportation 
by cargo boats to Italy.  The last phase, and the part of their experience that 
involved the most significant paradigm shift regarding their captors, 
comprises their stay in Italy until the Italian Armistice on 8 September 1943.  
This article looks at each phase as a collective experience but also highlights 
individual POW perspectives where these indicate noteworthy deviations 
from the general experience.  The specific aim of the article is to highlight 
how South African POWs viewed their Italian captors and how their opinion 
of their captors changed during each of the three phases of their captivity 
under Italian authority.  
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The article arises from research towards a doctoral study.  A 
significant component of the research consisted of collecting oral testimony 
and other first-hand accounts of South African POW experience, including 
diaries and memoirs.  As scholarly work on South African POW experience 
is extremely limited and lacks meaningful archival research, the collections 
of the Department of Defence Military archives, the National Archives as 
well as the collections at the Ditsong National Museum of Military History 
in Johannesburg and the sources at the Castle of Good Hope Military 
Museum in Cape Town were consulted.  
With regard to published work on South African POW experience, 
Maxwell Leigh’s work, Captives Courageous, is the most noteworthy.  
However, it is a basic narrative compiled from a selection of personal 
memoirs and lacks in-depth research and analysis.  Paul Schamberger’s 
book, Interlude in Switzerland, looks at the experiences of those South 
Africans who successfully escaped and reached the safety of neutral 
Switzerland.2  In the international academic arena, research on the historical 
experience of POWs is more prolific, and historians like Bob Moore and 
Kent Fedorowich, Barbara Hately-Broad, Arieh J. Kochavi, S.P. Mackenzie 
and Adrian Gilbert have all contributed significantly.3  In Prisoners of war 
and their captors, for instance, a number of authors contribute chapters on 
varying aspects of the topic.  In Chapter one, Moore investigates the 
problem faced by the British government as well as by Dominion 
governments on the matter of accommodation and transportation of Axis 
POWs.  Other themes include the role of the Geneva Convention (Joan 
Beaumont), the experiences of black POWs (David Killingray) and the role 
of the Dominion governments in the formulation of policy regarding POWs 
(J.F. Vance).4  Roger Absalom’s work on British POWs in Italy, especially 
Hiding History: The Allies, the Resistance and the Others in Occupied Italy 
1943–1945 was particularly useful for this article as it deals with issues such 
as the relationships between Italian peasants and British escapees, even 
though South African POWs are not specifically mentioned in Hiding 
History.5  
From the above, however, it is obvious that most international 
historians approach the topic thematically and do not differentiate between 
the different Commonwealth and Allied nationalities in European prisoner-
of-war camps.  Undeniably, there are many other aspects of POW 
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experience that an author may deem as more important than nationality, 
especially if many of those nationalities involved in the war formed part of 
the Commonwealth, which was seen as a common political unit. 
However, there are exceptions that investigate POW experience in its 
totality from the point of view of a specific nationality.  One such 
publication is W. Wynne Mason’s Prisoners of war: Official history of New 
Zealand in the Second World War 1939–45.6  Jonathan Vance’s work on 
Canadian POW experience is another example of such research.  In this 
work, Vance looks at Canadian POWs throughout the twentieth century.  
Most notably, in comparison to the situation in South Africa, it is clear from 
Vance’s research that, by the time World War Two started, Canada, 
although also a dominion of Great Britain, was better able to provide 
assistance to the Red Cross as this country was not directly affected by the 
war.  This is a legitimate point, which is emphasised by numerous South 
African POWs who referred to the Canadian Red Cross parcels as the best in 
terms of quality and quantity when compared to parcels from other Allied 
nations.7 
Although the tendency to categorise all Commonwealth soldiers as 
“British” is functional when the focus falls on themes, this approach does 
not take into account the unique context of each nationality.  Moreover, in 
the case of South Africans, the political and social milieu was especially 
relevant and would have influenced South African war experience as well as 
relations of captivity by enemy forces.  It is, however, necessary to consider 
South Africa’s unique war context as it illuminates the peculiarity and 
complexity of the country’s race and class relations.  At the start of the war, 
the Union was, obviously, divided among political, economic, class and, 
especially, racial lines.  While numerous English-speaking South Africans 
did not think twice about volunteering, many more Afrikaners were 
reluctant to do so, having grown up listening to their grandparents’ stories of 
British concentration camps during the South African War.  Although many 
Afrikaners volunteered, the majority of them did so mostly for financial 
reasons and not because they felt loyalty towards the British Empire or a 
commitment to the cause of the war.8   Furthermore, all of the former POWs 
who agreed to interviews were white South Africans and although an effort 
was made to locate veterans of the non-white forces, none was found.  
Similarly, the memoirs consulted for the study on which this article is based 
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were also written by white veterans, leaving the researcher with a one-sided 
view of the wartime race relations situation.  Occasional references to non-
white forces can, however, can be found in memoirs and in some cases in 
oral testimony, providing glimpses of non-white POW experiences.  That 
said, we do know that German and Italian treatment of black Allied soldiers 
was for the most part dreadful, as neither the Germans nor the Italians 
seemed to regard the Geneva Convention as having any bearing on the rights 
of black forces as they did not view them as regular forces.  African and 
coloured POWs were therefore in the worst possible position and possibly 
had to rely on each other more so than other POWs.  Many non-European 
soldiers from different parts of the Commonwealth endured bad treatment 
from their captors, and several were shot if they were seen to be too much 
trouble.9  These obvious differences between non-white, English- and 
Afrikaans-speaking South Africans regarding South Africa’s role in World 
War Two make for interesting research in the experience of POWs, as they 
were all forced into the same situation, and in some cases even the same 
prison camps, regardless of the racial, social or ideological differences 
between them. 
Phase One: Capture  
It is fairly safe to say that the morale among the 2nd South African Infantry 
Division must have been less than positive in the weeks before the fall of 
Tobruk in June 1942.  In December the previous year, a significant number 
of South Africans were captured at the Battle of Sidi Rezegh, and this, 
together with the seemingly endless digging of defences along the 30-mile 
bottleneck between the Mediterranean Sea and the Qattara Depression at El 
Alamein, demotivated many.10  Added to their frustration was the belief 
among some South Africans that their defences were inadequate, as Michael 
de Lisle of the 2nd Anti-Aircraft Regiment stated in his memoirs, “minefields 
had not been maintained and defensive positions had filled with sand”.11  To 
make matters worse, many South Africans regarded the Afrika Korps and its 
commander, Lieutenant General Erwin Rommel, as a superior strategist.  
Some historians believe that the entire Eighth Army developed an inferiority 
complex regarding the Germans, a view supported by the testimonies and 
memoirs of the war correspondent Ike Rosmarin and David Brokensha, a 
dispatch rider in the 2nd South Africa Division Signal Company.12  
Rosmarin concluded, “Eighth Army Command was simply out of its depth 
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when faced with the quirky genius of the ‘Desert Fox’.”13  Brokensha stated 
that Rommel “was our favourite General, I won’t say our only favourite 
German General, but for some reason we all … he had a very good name as 
a proper soldier, and very efficient.”14  
When Rommel advanced on Tobruk in 1942, the ensuing battle was 
characterised by chaos, misunderstandings and in some cases, seemingly 
phantom orders.  Rosmarin, for instance, described the combat as “terrifying 
[but] worst of all was the fact that we did not know what was happening as 
there were no orders from our officers.  Confusion reigned with fear and 
panic.”15  With regard to orders, some testimonies indicate that a so-called 
“every man-for-himself” order was given, while others recall orders to the 
contrary, including one which stated that a “tank-hunting” force was to be 
sent out during the night of 20 June.16  
In this highly volatile atmosphere, the accuracy of many of these 
testimonies is doubtful, as many of them do not correspond with other 
known positions.  For instance, the account of the events of 20 and 21 June 
by Major General H.B. Klopper, commanding officer of the forces at 
Tobruk, contradicts that of other statements made after the war.  According 
to Klopper, he “stressed to [Lieutenant] General [William] Gott that he felt 
very uneasy at the prospect at being invested [in Tobruk] and understood 
from [Gott] that the higher command would make every effort to prevent 
this.”17  In contrast, a 1946 interview with Colonel H. McA. Richards, 
commander of the Divisional Artillery, paraphrased Klopper’s earlier 
remark that if the Australians could hold Tobruk, then so could the South 
Africans.  The indecision and disagreements between those in command 
affected everyone at Tobruk – for instance, the Cape Town Highlanders 
received an order stating, “[i]f anyone leaves Tobruk now, they’ll be 
classified as a deserter”.  One of those Highlanders, Gordon Fry, believed 
that had an order of “every man for himself” been given, he would have 
been able to escape capture, something that troubled him deeply throughout 
his time as a POW.18  Others, however, simply took it for granted that it was 
a case of every man for himself and many attempted to escape.  However, 
the order seems never to have been given officially, as none of the men 
could say reliably where the order originated.  
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Nevertheless, once the soldiers became POWs, many of them felt a 
need to apportion blame, and in most cases, the leadership of the South 
African forces was held responsible.  For instance, Clive Luyt of the 2nd 
Anti-Aircraft Regiment believed that Klopper was liable as he was “straight 
from a desk in Pretoria [...] they sent [Klopper] up they stuck him in charge 
of Tobruk and about three days later Rommel and Co attacked Tobruk and 
we all ended in the bag”.19  Dick Dickinson of the Transvaal Scottish 
Regiment, however, made it clear that he did not blame Klopper for the 
surrender, as “you know Tobruk wasn’t in the same situation that it was 
when the Australians held it, I don’t think Klopper had a chance.”20  
Dickinson did, however, blame Klopper for apparently ordering the men not 
to attempt escape following the surrender order, as “General Klopper 
apparently had said we must not, not try and get out, and I was very critical 
of that.”21 
The widely held belief among soldiers and those in command that 
Klopper’s appointment was ill-advised was the result of inadequate, and in 
many cases inaccurate information regarding events surrounding the fall of 
Tobruk.  However, rumours began to spread and accusations of cowardice 
were aimed at the ordinary soldiers in the Union Defence Force, which may 
go some way to explain the way in which many South Africans tried to 
justify their capture by enemy forces.22  For instance, a prominent aspect in 
many of the testimonies is the claim that they were captured “unfairly”, or 
that they had not really been involved in the battle, as is evident in the 
account by Fred van Alphen Stahl, a volunteer in the 2nd Anti-Aircraft 
Regiment.  Van Alphen Stahl felt aggrieved at becoming a prisoner and 
described his experience as follows:  
… of course your first feelings as a prisoner war, this is the end […] I haven’t 
… I wasn’t busy fighting at the time […] we didn’t even realise it was Tobruk 
[…] and the next morning we were …, getting ready, getting our guns in order 
again, and a signal just came in and they said destroy your guns, destroy your 
vehicles, Tobruk has fallen …  You are now prisoners of war.23 
Similarly, Fred Geldenhuis of the South African Police Brigade, 
explained that they were left without transport and weapons, and that not 
even one shot was fired by his Brigade at the time of the battle.  
Remarkably, Geldenhuis also claimed that he had been in Klopper’s “dugout 
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[preparing] Molotov cocktails” when Klopper made known his intention to 
surrender.24  
Considering the common state of mind in the 2nd Division, the general 
high regard for Rommel and the chaos of the battle, it is perhaps not 
surprising that most South African POWs reacted negatively to the news 
that they were to be handed over to the Italians, even if, as reported in some 
cases, the news was delivered by Rommel himself.  Bernard Schwikkard of 
the Transvaal Scottish remembers that Rommel informed the group of 
POWs that he was “sorry to be handing us over to the Italians, but he needed 
all his soldiers to do the fighting.  [Rommel] indicated that, as soldiers, the 
Italians were a miserable lot.”25  Rommel’s opinion about the Italians seems 
to have influenced some South African’s view of their captors.  One 
example is Wessel Oosthuizen of the Police Brigade, whose attitude towards 
the Italians was not only remarkably similar to that of Rommel’s, but 
seemed to have remained unchanged until 2010, when Oosthuizen stated 
during an interview that, although he did not want to place the Italians in a 
bad light, they did not compare well to the German soldiers.26 
Both the Germans and the South Africans viewed the Italians as 
inferior and to a certain extent, the Germans acted on this by siding with the 
South African POWs in cases where the Italians tried to take advantage of 
their prisoners.  One incident, which shows this, was when a South African 
exchanged his watch for a helmet filled with water to revive a friend during 
a forced march.  A German soldier who witnessed the incident intervened by 
punching the Italian, replacing the brackish water with clean water from his 
own water can, and by finally returning the watch to the POW.27  The 
general high regard for Rommel among South African POWs, Rommel’s 
successful taking of Tobruk and the negative attitude among Germans, not 
least Rommel himself regarding their Italian allies, seemed to have been the 
main factors that shaped the South African’s initial opinion of their Italian 
captors.  
When the Germans moved on and the Italians assumed complete 
control of the thousands of Allied POWs, it soon became evident that the 
Italians were ill-prepared to deal with the large number of captives.  As a 
result, the provision of food and water was sporadic, something which is 
emphasised in most POW narratives of their experience in North Africa.  
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The desperation among prisoners to survive amidst the lack of basic 
provisions often forced POWs to cower to their captors in an attempt to 
ensure they receive their share when the scarce foodstuffs arrived.  Initially, 
the POWs were accommodated in temporary camps, which in most cases 
were simple wire enclosures.  Bill Hindshaw of the Rand Light Infantry 
remembers, “water was the thing, food and water … but water was the 
thing”.  When he and fellow POWs finally reached Italy, they were able to 
weigh themselves.  Bill had lost fifty pounds (22,7 kg) since his capture.28  
No archival evidence could be found and none of the oral testimonies or 
memoirs referred to the delivery of Red Cross parcels or to inspections of 
POW camps in North Africa at that time.  
Initially, men of all nationalities were grouped together in the 
temporary camps around Tobruk and Benghazi, and it is in testimony of this 
early stage of captivity that attitudes regarding race and nationality become 
clear.  While some historians view troubled race relations as distinctive to 
South Africans, memoirs show otherwise, indicating that generalisations are 
not always appropriate as some South Africans expressed racist attitudes in 
their memoirs while others emphasised the good relationships that existed 
between South Africans of different races.  One such example is that of Ben 
Hermer, a medical officer with the 17th Field Ambulance, and his batman 
July Monaremi, who supported him throughout the battles in North Africa.29  
On the other hand, South Africans did express negative attitudes regarding 
race, as was the case with Dennis Mugglestone of the 6th Infantry Police 
Brigade who noted dispassionately in his memoirs how Germans shot dead 
black POWs because they “were too drunk to move any further, and the 
Jerries [Germans] could not be worried.  This was the result of the liquor 
[the black soldiers] stole from Battalion HQ the previous night.”30  Racism 
was, however, not limited to South Africans as can be seen in the 
observations of other dominion POWs.  A POW belonging to New 
Zealand’s forces described “South African Blacks” and “Springboks” as two 
separate groups, and makes a point that while in POW camp in Tobruk “all 
conventional values were gone.  The private no longer deferred to his officer 
nor black man to white.”31  
The use of local Senussi tribesmen to guard the camps did nothing to 
raise respect among POWs toward their Italian captors.  L.G. Tupper of the 
Kaffrarian Rifles, described them as “a lot of black Senussi bastards 
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guarding us and they would shoot for the slightest provocation.  I remember 
one chap who showed them the ‘V’ for victory sign and was shot.”32  A 
member of the Middelandse Regiment, Jack Mortlock, described the 
behaviour of the Senussi guards as appalling, leaving Mortlock with a desire 
for revenge.  According to Mortlock, the Senussi guards – 
… endeavoured to make their wishes known by bashing you about with a rifle 
butt.  I believe there were cases of prisoners being shot by these creatures.  
Furthermore, if they noticed watches, fountain pens etc, these were 
immediately ripped off.  It was indeed a lucky thing for the Senussis that none 
of the prisoners whom they handled were (sic) in the victorious Eight Army 
advance in the latter part of 1942.33  
It was in North Africa where these men had to come to terms with the 
shock of being taken prisoner and with their POW status, a task made all the 
more difficult by the negative attitude towards Italians.  This was 
exacerbated by chaotic battle experiences, a perceived lack of leadership 
from their own command, and the ensuing disillusion of being handed over 
to an “inferior” enemy, lack of food and water and the exploitative 
behaviour of both Italian and Senussi guards. 
Phase Two: From Bad to Worse 
For the most part, POW testimony of their experience in North Africa is 
characterised by negative statements and expressions of hatred towards the 
Italians and Senussi guards.  However, when POWs were transported by 
cargo ships to Italy, the testimonies begin to reflect a more varied outlook 
among the POWs.  While in the main the experiences on the cargo ships 
were horrific, there were isolated examples of POWs who viewed their 
transport to Italy in a more positive light.  However, this is ironic as in some 
cases, the testimony contradicts the actual experience.  It is almost as if 
some POWs started to display an attitude of resigned acceptance of their fate 
as they moved further away from the African continent. 
Although the journey from Africa to Italy only lasted between five and 
ten days, many POWs blamed the Italians for intentionally creating poor 
conditions on the ships.  The POWs were also of the opinion that their 
captors deliberately inflicted torment on their captives.  Cargo spaces were 
packed to capacity with men, and movement was severely limited.  The lack 
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of toilet facilities below deck was a severe problem to which the Italians 
responded by providing buckets, but as most POWs were by now afflicted 
by dysentery, this provision was utterly inadequate and men found 
themselves lying or sitting in bodily waste.  
In some instances, men were allowed to go on deck to use the toilet 
facilities there, but most dysentery cases were too weak to climb the ropes or 
rope ladders that were lowered into the hold.  In any event, toilets on deck 
were not necessarily much better, as in some examples it meant nothing 
more than a bucket system requiring men to balance on a pole suspended 
over the container.34  At night, hatches over the holds were closed, which 
resulted in at least one death as a result of suffocation on the Rosalina Pilo, 
a ship that transported POWs from Benghazi to Tripoli in August 1942.35  
For David Brokensha’s brother Paul, the journey to Italy was the low 
point of his entire POW experience, and in his memoirs, David recalled how 
the usually optimistic Paul exclaimed, “God?  There is no God.”36  In 
contrast, Michael de Lisle remembered how they became “drunk on sugar” 
when they discovered food on their ship.  The provisions were to be 
delivered to Italian soldiers at Tripoli from where the POWs would then 
continue to Italy.  Even when the Italians realised that the prisoners had 
helped themselves to the foodstuffs, the POWs seemingly did not display 
any fear at the Italians who started “[s]hooting left and right and threatening 
us with all sorts of terrible tortures”.37  On another occasion, De Lisle had 
time to enter into amicable conversation with German anti-aircraft soldiers 
who were also aboard the same ship.38 
Another example of blame for suffering aimed at the Italians was the 
case of the events surrounding the San Sebastian.  This ship, carrying 
mostly prisoners who had been captured during the Battle of Sidi Rezegh, 
was torpedoed by HMS Porpoise in December 1941, resulting in the deaths 
of between 350 and 450 men.39  The pandemonium that resulted following 
the attack on the ship and the Italians’ panicky response to it once again 
served to further dent the POWs’ opinion of their Italian captors.  At least 
two South Africa POWs on board the San Sebastian insisted that the ship’s 
captain and most of the officers used the lifeboats to save themselves while 
many of the POWs were being sucked underwater by the ship’s propellers as 
they tried to swim to shore.40  Both Mason and Gilbert corroborate the 
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abandonment of the ship by the Italian captain and crew and both record that 
a German naval engineer then took command.41  Yet, the available historical 
record is not certain in its details.  
From POW testimony, it is clear that none of the South Africans took 
into consideration the Italian lack of preparedness for the vast number of 
prisoners.  Their hardship while on board the ships were simply seen as 
another form of punishment.  Events beyond the Italians’ control, such as 
the torpedoing of the San Sebastian, were also not taken into consideration 
by the POWs, who simply viewed their suffering as the result of Italian 
vindictiveness towards their captives as well as the Italian lack of 
organisational ability.  
Phase Three: Work and Liberty 
Disembarking on Italian shores was for many POWs a shock.  Seeing the 
bad state of both the civilians and the country overwhelmed many, mainly 
because it illustrated to them how their attitude towards the Italians were 
shaped by their bad experiences in North Africa.  It was especially the 
Italian civilians whose actions towards the POWs made it clear to the 
captives that it was necessary to differentiate between groups when forming 
opinions on Italians.  Civilians and the armed forces were the two main 
groups, but among them there were soldiers and camp guards, officers and 
rank and file, as well as Fascists and Partisans.  Contact between POWs and 
each of these groups resulted in different viewpoints and perceptions 
regarding Italians. 
When the POWs arrived in Italy, the way in which their attitudes were 
formed towards their captors were once again changed by external 
circumstances.  The majority of South Africans arrived at Brindisi and were 
sent to Camp 85 in Tuturano or Camp 75 near Bari.  At this stage of their 
journey, many were still suffering from dysentery and virtually all were 
fighting a losing battle against a severe lice epidemic.  Many associate their 
arrival in Italian camps with a chance to be deloused, hot showers, haircuts 
and receiving additional clothing.  From here, many POWs were given the 
opportunity to volunteer for work, mostly on farms or in factories.42  
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Those who chose to remain in the larger permanent prison camps were 
dependent on their captors for food and clothing and they were less able 
than POWs in work camps to improve their living conditions with regard to 
accommodation.  As a result, many POWs retained their initial rancour 
towards the Italian military.  Luyt was of the opinion that the “conditions [in 
the camps] were not good because the Italians couldn’t organise, […] there 
was always some stupid argument [about the lack of food] pure rotten 
organisation by the Italians”.43  On the other hand, it was upon their arrival 
in Italy that South African POWs received their first Red Cross parcels, and 
although they had to share the contents, it lifted their spirits enormously.  
Dick Dickinson of the Transvaal Scottish Regiment states, “of course our 
Red Cross parcels made a hell of a difference, we couldn’t have lived 
without those parcels”,44 while Herbert Rhodes (Aussie) Hammond of the 
1st Brigade Signal Corps describes the arrival of the first Red Cross parcels 
at Tuturano camp as an event that “sent prisoners wild with joy.”45  
Hindshaw and his fellow POWs were told that each parcel had to be shared 
between ten men,46 and, according to Mugglestone, the first Red Cross 
parcels that arrived at Camp 82 had to be shared between 18 men.  
Nevertheless, the prisoners were so happy to receive their consignments that 
their applause caused those guards who were unaware of the arrival of 
parcels to assume that the war had ended, for “they slung their rifles away 
and started dancing and cheering with the prisoners”.47 
The arrival of Red Cross parcels changed the balance of power 
between captives and captors, as it allowed the prisoners to use the contents 
to barter with the guards.  Hindshaw remembers that some Red Cross items 
were more valuable than others, especially “coffee, chocolates and 
cigarettes, oh, you could bargain for anything on those things, but it was all 
on the side”.48  Stanley Smollan of the Transvaal Scottish Regiment also 
remembers, “when those parcels first arrive the tables were turned because 
we had the food and the money”.49  
While the South African POWs in Italy viewed their Red Cross 
parcels as a great improvement to their recent circumstances, authorities in 
Pretoria did not feel the same.  It was felt that Union POWs in Italy would 
endure  
… great hardship owing to lack of adequate food and clothing if anything 
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should happen to cause a serious dislocation of Red Cross parcel supplies [and] 
that it be established beyond doubt that Italian Government are in fact carrying 
out their obligations under the Prisoners of War Convention.50  
The vulnerability of the Union’s POWs was underlined by comparison 
of their circumstances with those of Italian POWs in South Africa who 
were, according to Squadron Leader Keeling of the British Red Cross 
Society, “receiving, quantitatively, three times as much food as our men in 
Italy are receiving”.51  Similarly, Smollan considered Italian POWs in the 
Union as “very lucky indeed because they had a wonderful life [in South 
Africa] and they were looked after, for us it was just the opposite”.52   
Not all POWs in Italy, however, relied on Italian authorities for their 
welfare, and when the opportunity to volunteer for work parties came up, it 
was seen as a chance to improve their food supply and accommodation.  
Farm work allowed POWs to establish relationships with Italian civilians, as 
often the farmers were put in charge of, or worked alongside the POWs.  
The greater freedom on the farms made it possible for POWs to take a more 
active role in their own fate, they were able to use their initiative to arrange 
their living conditions and they were able to access more food.  As 
Hindshaw states, “we went out working, which was actually a Godsend, 
[be]cause in the Prisoner-of-War camps, the food was too ghastly, the 
amount …”53  Brokensha fondly recalls how they volunteered for farm work 
during the Italian summer,  
… and that was lovely, just to go out and it wasn’t very hard [work] and then 
[during lunchtime] we’d strip and put all our clothes in a big pile and the 
guards would lie on [our clothes] and [we would] swim down the Tiber and 
sometimes girls would come over, […] but the guards knew that we couldn’t 
escape you know.54  
When writing his memoirs, Brokensha even compared the scene next to the 
Tiber to a romantic Breughel painting.55  
Although most POWs in work parties seemed testify to improved 
relationships between them and their captors, feelings of animosity from the 
POWs towards their guards remained and became evident in their 
behaviour.  In Schwikkard’s work party, for instance, a POW exchanged his 
old uniform for a sentry’s new uniform, which the sentry had washed and 
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hung to dry on the barbed wire of the camp.  After a few weeks, the culprit 
was caught, but the POWs convinced the Italian officer that the sentry 
should join the POW in the cooler as the barbed wire he used as a drying 
rack actually belonged to the POWs!56  In another example, Hindshaw’s 
group used to invite the guards to join them in playing games.  One of the 
games was bok-bok (high cockalorum), and for the POWs it was a matter of 
pride to make sure that the Italians “were bucked down first!”57 
Throughout the summer months of 1943, rumours about an armistice 
reached POWs in camps across Italy, and during this time of uncertainty, the 
relationship between POWs and Italians underwent yet another change.  
Matthys Beukes of the President Steyn Regiment believed that the Italians 
feared retaliation from the POWs as a result of the bad treatment they had 
meted out in the past.58  Hindshaw remembered that at first, guards became 
very friendly when they heard of Mussolini’s toppling, and then, when the 
Armistice was finally agreed, “every sentry bar one changed into civvies and 
destroyed his rifle”.59  While still in North Africa, most POWs were of the 
opinion that the Italians were unworthy adversaries, but the way most Italian 
guards reacted when they heard about the armistice, confirmed to POWs that 
the Italians were never committed to war in the first place. 
Initially, POWs regarded the armistice as a sign that their captivity 
was coming to an end.  For many, this was indeed the case, as thousands of 
POWs walked out of prison camps as Italian guards abandoned their posts.  
However, for many POWs, the decision to leave camp was a difficult one, as 
rumours from various sources, including from Italian guards and civilians, 
seemed to indicate that the Allies were about to initiate an elaborate rescue 
plan.  Michael de Lisle recalls that there were “tremendous rumours of 
landing[s] up the coasts of Italy on both sides”.60  He also remembers, 
however, that another message, supposedly sent from a MI9 source, urged 
POWs to remain in their camps and warned of “disciplinary action to 
prevent individual prisoners of war attempting to rejoin their own units”.61  
The confusion was universal among all Allied POWs and of those who 
escaped many were confronted by Italians who tried to convince them not to 
continue their journeys to Allied territory, but to wait for the imminent 
arrival of the Allied forces.62  
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It would be impossible to determine the number of South African 
POWs who escaped successfully after the armistice, however, of the 79 000 
Allied POWs, almost 50 000 left their Italian camps in August 1943.  
German forces, however, recaptured most of them and a year later, only 
4 000 arrived in neutral Switzerland and 6 500 managed to reach Allied 
lines.63  A total of 896 South African POWs, all escapees from Italy, 
managed to enter Switzerland.64  Many escaped South Africans, however, 
decided to remain among the Italians, fighting alongside the Partisans, while 
others lived among peasants or in the mountains, waiting for either the 
Allies or the end of the war.65 
Those who managed to evade recapture by German forces became 
reliant on Italian peasants for food, shelter and information.  It was during 
this stage of their experience, that POWs formed a positive attitude towards 
the Italian peasants, and in some cases, some POWs even joined the partisan 
movement and fought alongside their new-found allies.66  Fred Geldenhuis 
was one of those who managed to successfully escape after the armistice.  
He returned to Italy and fought alongside the Partisans, was recaptured by 
the Germans and sent to Stalag VIIA Moosburg, one of the largest German 
prison camps.  While still in Italy, such a strong bond developed between 
Geldenhuis and his Italian allies, that the dedication his memoirs, A 
Soldier’s scrapbook, reads  
… let me not forget to mention the Italian people who so ably assisted and fed 
us while in the mountains, many times at their peril and with dire 
consequences.  Without their help and kindness many of us would not have 
survived.  To the young Italians who, with threats of death from fascists and 
Germans, were willing to join the partisan forces, many of who fought side by 
side with me.  Many were executed after being captured.  I will always 
remember them.67 
Smollan experienced a similar change of heart when he escaped and 
became dependent on Italian peasants for his welfare.  In particular, it was 
his experiences with the Venetonni and De Lellis families, as well their 
cooperation with the Italian partisans, that convinced Smollan that most 
Italian peasants were essentially good natured.68  After his return to Allied 
forces at Anzio in February 1944, Smollan returned to South Africa and 
decided to repay his debt to his Italian collaborators by attempting to secure 
the release of the son of the De Lellis family.  Tammasso De Lellis, a 
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member of Italy’s Fascist forces, had been a POW in the Zonderwater prison 
camp near Pretoria.  Upon his return to South Africa, Smollan started 
sending food parcels to De Lellis, and in September 1946, Smollan wrote to 
the adjutant general in Pretoria in an attempt to secure “priority repatriation 
in consideration of services rendered to myself and other South Africans in 
assisting [with] escape from Italy”.69  Although it seems that the authorities 
in South Africa were willing to facilitate the repatriation, De Lellis was 
required to sign a document stating his compliance to cooperate with the 
Allies.70  In a personal conversation between De Lellis and Smollan, the 
Italian POW admitted that he could not openly declare his collaboration 
“from fear of his comrades’ reaction, [and also] from personal humiliation 
he would have to suffer in deserting [Fascist] principles he as stood by for so 
long”.71  Smollan continued to support De Lellis and even tried to convince 
the authorities that De Lellis be made available for work outside of the 
camp.  However, the matter came to a disappointing end when the 
Zonderwater camp commander finally informed Smollan October 1946 that 
De Lellis was  
… afforded every opportunity to acquire Co-operator benefits [but] he 
resolutely declined to abandon his adherence to Fascist principles and 
designation, except upon the condition that he be transferred from this camp 
[and] it would appear that there is nothing further to be done in the matter, and 
that to continue to pursue it would serve no useful purpose.72  
The fact of the matter was that De Lellis agreed to pledge his 
cooperation if he was able to do so away from his fellow POWs, but as there 
were no other POW camps in South Africa, it was not possible to transfer 
him.  Smollan’s attempts at reparation were therefore unsuccessful.73  
Conclusion  
Perhaps the most accurate description of South African POW attitude 
towards Italians is Michael de Lisle’s summary in which he differentiates 
between the different groups in Italy.  According to De Lisle, the ordinary 
Italian soldiers in North Africa were “despised as being lapdogs of the 
Germans”.  When the South Africans reached Italy, they formed friendships 
with the camp guards and realised the guards were “poor downtrodden 
conscripts, their heart wasn’t in [the war]”.  De Lisle also made it clear that 
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the Italian officers were taking advantage of their position and displayed 
“scorn for their private soldiers”.  Like many others who escaped following 
the armistice, De Lisle’s attitude towards the civilian population, especially 
the peasants, changed dramatically.  Most escapees felt they owned these 
people a huge debt of gratitude.  As De Lisle said, they were “people with 
hearts of gold, and I just owe my life to them for the risks they took in 
feeding us when the penalties [were] enormously severe”.74 
Looking at the experiences and the reactions to treatment from their 
Italian captors, it becomes clear that South African POWs changed their 
views of their captors as their own circumstances changed during the war.  
Each man in the Union Forces entered the war from his own unique context, 
but all of them experienced similar conditions when captured and all of them 
reacted similarly when confronted with the treatment meted out by their 
Italian captors.  This indicates that the attitudes, whether they were positive 
or negative, displayed by South African POWs towards the Italians, were 
not just the result of a specific predetermined attitude held by the South 
Africans before they became POWs.  Their attitudes and reactions towards 
the Italians were equally the result of their response to the external events 
after capture, and not simply a result of the fact that their captors were 
Italian. 
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